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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—THE POWERS OF STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL TO DETERMINE PUBLIC INTEREST
I.

INTRODUCTION

State attorneys general (AGs) are politicizing the office of the Attorney
General by taking partisan positions and failing to enforce (or defend) state
laws.1 Across the country, state AGs have become more aggressive in litigating high-profile cases that can springboard an AG into the political spotlight.2 Each state’s AG has similar duties and “job descriptions,” but they all
have different permissions or restrictions on their powers and responsibilities.3
In some states, the AG is vested with the common law powers and duties unless the state constitution or state statutes expressly or impliedly provide to the contrary.4 Other states recognize that an AG’s inherent common
law powers “are not subject to statutory reduction.”5 In both situations, unless otherwise prescribed, AGs have the opportunity to refuse to defend state
law and have free rein to control all litigation involving their states, based
on “the public’s interest.”6
State AGs are charged with the duties of the chief legal officers for
their states and typically serve two main roles.7 State AGs serve as lawyers
to their governors and state agencies, and they “serve as lawyers for the state
as a whole,” representing the public’s interest.8 State AGs have both the
motivation and authority to advance important public policy goals.9 Many
state AGs have increased the politicization of their offices and are litigating
to legislate instead of allowing the legislative branch to fulfill its duty to
1. Alan Greenblatt, State AGs Are Increasingly Powerful—and Partisan, GOVERNING
(Sept. 2016), https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-state-attorneys-general.html.
2. Elaine S. Povich, When a State Attorney General Takes on a National Fight, What’s
He Gunning For?, PEW: STATELINE (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/11/11/when-a-state-attorney-general-takes-on-a-nationalfight-whats-he-gunning-for.
3. Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General,
and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2123 (2015).
4. 7A C.J.S. Att’y Gen. § 28 (2019).
5. Id.
6. See NAT’L POLICY & LEGAL ANALYSIS NETWORK (NPLAN), PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR.
AT WILLIAM MITCHELL COLL. OF LAW, STATE AGS: WHO THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY DO 2
(2010),
https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/phlc-fs-agwho
what-2010.pdf.
7. Id. at 1.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2.
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propose and make law.10 This note addresses the uncertainty surrounding the
common law duties and powers of state AGs and what state AGs should do
when the public’s interest is in question.
Part II of this note provides the common law background relating to
state attorneys general. Part III surveys the common law powers of state
AGs, attempts to answer the question of how to determine the public’s interest in controversial situations, and reviews the AG’s duty to defend state
law. Finally, Part IV provides an argument that proposes to align the duties
of state AGs to be consistent with one another, determines the actual constitutional duties of state AGs, and defines the “public’s interest” to impose the
duty to defend.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Attorney General of England

In 1243, the King of England appointed an attorney to represent the
King’s interests in each major court, dubbing him “King’s attorney.”11 His
duties included
initiating actions to recover rents and lands, proceeding against those
who pronounced a sentence of excommunication against a royal servant,
guarding the King’s right to present to churches, investigating homicides
to hear and determine what pertained to the Crown, and on one occasion,
engaging in a special mission to discover the marriages, wards, reliefs,
and other royal rights which had been conceded or alienated within a
particular township since the time of King John’s coronation. 12

In 1461, the King appointed attorneys for life, authorized them to appoint subordinates to carry out the King’s attorney’s duties, provided these
attorneys to give legal advice to the House of Lords, and dubbed the King’s
attorney the “Attorney General of England.”13 In the seventeenth century,
the AG began to advise the House of Commons in drafting legislation and
10. See, e.g., id.; AG Paxton Sues Battleground States for Unconstitutional Changes to
2020 Election Laws, KEN PAXTON, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX. (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www
.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-sues-battleground-states-unconstitutionalchanges-2020-election-laws (announcing the lawsuit filed by the Texas AG to contest the
2020 presidential election); Attorney General James Files Lawsuit to Dissolve NRA, LETITIA
JAMES, NY ATT’Y GEN. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2020/attorneygeneral-james-files-lawsuit-dissolve-nra (announcing the lawsuit filed by the New York AG
attempting to dissolve the NRA).
11. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 2 (Emily Myers ed., 4th ed. 2018).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
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gave legal advice to various departments of state.14 During this time, the AG
established that his duty extended to the public’s interest and became more
of a people’s lawyer than a government lawyer for the Crown.15 At the same
time, in 1643, the first attorney general was appointed in the American colony of Virginia.16
B.

Historical Background of States’ Attorneys General

Early state attorneys general were modeled after the AG of England
and existed in each of the thirteen American colonies.17 State AGs struggled
to fulfill their duties as proficiently as their English counterparts due to a
lack of capable and willing appointees.18 As the National Association of
Attorneys General (NAAG) points out, state AGs were probably present
“for some time before the AG was mentioned in official records.”19 Even in
early American history, AGs had duties and responsibilities that were influenced by other nations in addition to the English common law.20
Of the fifty states, thirty-four states either created or maintained the office of AG in their original state constitutions, and eight others established
an AG by law.21 Arkansas, for example, originally split the office of the AG
into judicial districts until it “was unified in 1843 by legislative act, and the
unified office was made constitutional in 1912.”22
As the United States grew, states gave their AGs more autonomy and
more power by making the office a popularly elected position.23 State AGs
may investigate both governmental and non-governmental entities, and
some state AGs have the statutory authority to bring a multitude of cases to
court.24 In areas from cybercrime to tobacco regulation, state AGs provide a
broad range of services, leading some AGs to create task forces and special
units for specific legal areas.25 In most states, the AG has both broad common law authority as well as specific statutory duties prescribed in state
14. Id.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id.
17. William P. Marshall, Break up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General,
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2450 (2006).
18. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., supra note 11, at 4.
19. Id. at 5 (discussing the lack of records in early American history and an example
from Maryland, which was first “settled” in 1634, but the AG was not mentioned in official
records until twenty-four years later, in 1658).
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Marshall, supra note 17, at 2451.
24. See id. at 2452; NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., supra note 11, at 11.
25. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., supra note 11, at 46–47.
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constitutions and statutes.26 As of 2019, “forty-three state attorneys general
are elected and forty-eight are free from gubernatorial control.”27 No state
has moved in the opposite direction and placed the AG under direct control
of the Governor.28 Most state AGs have common law powers, limited to
some extent by statute.29 However, in some states, state legislatures have
broadened the scope of the duties of state AGs by adopting new laws and
programs.30
C.

The United States Attorney General

The U.S. Constitution is silent regarding the AG, but the Judiciary Act
of 1789 created the Attorney General of the United States and stated that he
was to be appointed by the Supreme Court.31 However, the bill was changed
to provide that the President instead of the Supreme Court appoint the AG.32
The United States AG is charged to prosecute and conduct all suits in the
Supreme Court in which the United States might be concerned.33
Edmund Randolph was the first Attorney General of the United States,
appointed by President George Washington.34 The early role of the U.S. AG
was limited, and these limitations frustrated Randolph to the point that he
complained by letter to President Washington.35
The letter included requests that Congress would
(1) require the district attorneys to keep the Attorney General informed
of judicial business and to follow his instructions on such matters, (2) authorize the Attorney General to advocate the interests of the United
States in any case in which the United States was interested, whether or
not the Attorney General had been involved in bringing the suit, and (3)
provide a clerk.36

All requests from the letter were denied except for the portion relating
to the requirement to keep the U.S. AG informed of lower court proceedings.37 The U.S. AG had no power over district attorneys.38 The U.S. AG had
26. Id. at 34–35.
27. Marshall, supra note 17, at 2452.
28. See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., supra note 11, at 46.
29. Id. at 44.
30. Id. at 11.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id.
33. 28 U.S.C. §§ 516–518 (2020).
34. Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional
Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 564, 583 (1989).
35. Id. at 585.
36. Id. at 587.
37. Id.
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very little power and was directed to “prosecute and conduct all suits in the
Supreme Court in which the United States was concerned.”39 However,
“Congress was notably silent regarding who was to decide when and whether the interests of the United States were ‘concerned’ and warranted representation in the courts.”40
In the first decade of the new United States of America, only three AGs
represented the U.S. in the Supreme Court a grand total of six times.41 But in
that same time period, these first three AGs authored more than forty opinions.42 Most states had their own AGs, who were tasked with serving the
state and its people’s interests.43 The power and support by state level officials that state AGs had was greater than the power and support of the U.S.
AG.44
The U.S. AG’s role in law has expanded and given the U.S. AG more
authority within the Judiciary.45 The U.S. AG generally represents the government in matters concerning the United States and provides opinions to
the President and other departments of the federal government, although
many agencies are permitted to hire separate counsel.46 The U.S. AG is also
head of the Department of Justice, which oversees the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and various other Department of Justice agencies,47 but does not
hold any power besides that of political persuasion over state AGs. The U.S.
AG, a legal position by name, is unquestionably a political position since the
U.S. AG’s loyalties are to the President rather than to public interest.48
38. Id. at 585–86.
39. Bloch, supra note 35, at 579.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 589–90.
42. Id. at 589.
43. See COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., COMMON
LAW POWERS OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 10–12 (1975), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/Digitization/16297NCJRS.pdf.
44. See id. at 22.
45. Bloch, supra note 35, at 618–21.
46. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., supra note 11, at 10.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Is an Attorney General Independent or Political? Barr
Rekindles a Debate, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019
/05/01/us/politics/attorney-general-barr.html (questioning U.S. Attorney General Barr and his
handling of the Mueller Report as well as his position in being described as White House
counsel); Ron Elving, A Brief History of Nixon’s ‘Saturday Night Massacre,’ NPR (Oct. 21,
2018, 8:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/21/659279158/a-brief-history-of-nixonssaturday-night-massacre (describing the firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, the
resignations of AG Elliot Richardson, and the firing of Deputy AG William Ruckelshaus). In
both of these situations, the AG was in a position to act either in the public’s interest or in the
interests of the President.
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Fast-forward to 2011, where U.S. AG Eric Holder stated that the Department of Justice would no longer defend the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA).49 Oddly, AG Holder stated that the Department of Justice would
stay on as a party to the cases regarding DOMA to “represent the interests of
the United States throughout the litigation.”50 AG Holder asserted that the
President had concluded that Section Three of DOMA was unconstitutional.51 However, the President’s constitutional duty is to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,”52 not to determine whether an act of Congress
is constitutional. The AG has the authority to represent, defend, and enforce
the legal interests of the United States, as well as advise and opine on legal
matters to the President and the Cabinet.53
III.
A.

SURVEY OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL

Common Law Powers and the Public’s “Interest”

The common law provides AGs with the “authority to represent, defend, and enforce the legal interests of state government and the public.”54
With the adoption of the English common law in America, “[l]ittle attempt
was made to define or enumerate [the AG’s] duties, for the American Attorney General became possessed of the common law powers of the English
Attorney General.”55
A common theme explored in the following cases is, “What is the public’s interest?” It seems to be a simple question, but the discretion provided
to state AGs to litigate in the public’s interest leads to case selection that
benefits the state AG’s political ambitions rather than the best interests of
the state.
According to the Mississippi Code, the AG “shall have the powers of
the Attorney General at common law and, except as otherwise provided by
law, is given the sole power to bring or defend a lawsuit on behalf of a state
agency, the subject matter of which is of statewide interest.”56 In State ex
49. U.S. ATT’Y GEN., STATEMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON LITIGATION
INVOLVING THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, P.R.N. 11-222 (Feb. 23, 2011).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
53. Organization, Mission & Functions Manual: Attorney General, Deputy and Associate, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functionsmanual-attorney-general (last updated Sept. 9, 2014).
54. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN, supra note 11, at 27.
55. Id. at 31 (quoting Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney General in England and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 307, 309 (1958))
(first alteration original); see supra Part II.
56. MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-1 (2019).
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rel. Patterson for the Use and Benefit of Adams County v. Warren,57 the
Court discussed the common law powers of the state AG:
At common law the duties of the attorney general, as chief law officer of
a realm, were numerous and varied. He was chief legal adviser of the
crown, was entrusted with the management of all legal affairs, and prosecution of all suits, criminal and civil, in which the crown was interested.
He had authority to institute proceedings to abate public nuisances, affecting public safety and convenience, to control and manage all litigation on behalf of the state, and to intervene in all actions which were of
concern to the general public.58

Thus, in Mississippi as in many other states, the AG has the authority
to intervene or act in any matter determined of “concern to the general public.”59 However, the way in which the AG determines whether a matter is
“of concern to the general public” or in the public’s interest is not described.60
Another case that details the Mississippi AG’s powers and responsibilities at common law is Bell v. State,61 a case pertaining to illegal gambling.
This case establishes that the Mississippi AG has all of the power and authority from the common law.62 In Bell, the court held the AG is “a constitutional officer possessed of all the power and authority inherited from the
common law as well as that specially conferred upon him by statute.”63 Also, in Gandy v. Reserve Life Insurance Co., the court held that the AG has
the authority and the duty to preserve “the lawfully enacted statutes of the
state.”64 That authority includes “the right to institute, conduct and maintain
all suits necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the state, preservation
of order and the protection of public rights.”65 These duties, both from statute and from common law, provide the Mississippi AG with virtually unfettered power to dictate suits that involve the state or the public’s interest.
State ex rel. Williams v. Karston66 upholds the notion that the AG
“‘control[s] . . . all litigation in behalf of the state’” and may “‘intervene in
all suits or proceedings which are of concern to the general public.’”67
Karston confirmed the Arkansas AG’s power to “‘institute proceedings to
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

180 So.2d 293 (Miss. 1965).
Id. at 299.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
678 So.2d 994 (Miss. 1996).
Id. at 996.
Id.
279 So.2d 648, 649 (Miss. 1973).
Id.
208 Ark. 703, 187 S.W.2d 327 (Ark. 1945).
Id. at 708, 187 S.W.2d at 329 (quoting 5 AM. JUR. § 234).
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restrain acts which are injurious to public health, safety, or morals, and [to]
prevent any invasion upon the rights of the public in highways, parks, and
other public lands, and in navigable waters.’”68 The AG may intervene and
join suits as long as the action was in the public’s interest.69
The Mississippi AG’s unconstrained power was tested and slightly limited in the following case. In Williams v. State,70 the defendant was tried and
convicted, receiving a sentence of life in prison. But, after new evidence
came to light and the case was remanded, the district attorney sought an
order of nolle prosequi, which was granted.71 The AG’s office subsequently
was appointed as special prosecutor, and Williams moved to dismiss, claiming the original nolle prosequi brought the case to an end.72 The AG’s office
argued that Bell73 applied and that the AG is vested with constitutional,
common law, and statutory authority that entitle the AG to prosecute the
defendant.74 However, the court stated, “Mississippi law does not permit a
trial court to disqualify a duly elected and serving district attorney and replace him with the attorney general where the district attorney has decided,
in the lawful exercise of his discretion, not to prosecute.”75 Although the AG
was not permitted to continue trying this case, there was only a slight limit
placed on the AG’s ability to manage all litigation on behalf of the state and
intervene in actions which are of concern to the general public, as long as
those actions are not opposed to or in conflict with the district attorney’s. 76
State v. Heath,77 a Tennessee case, looked at whether the AG’s powers
are limited by the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The court held that
the AG can basically act in any situation using public interest as the underlying reason for suit.78 The court stated that the AG “may exercise such authority as the public interest may require and may file suits necessary for the
enforcement of state laws and public protection.”79 Further, “the attorney
general may participate in litigation of a private character where it bears on
the interest of the general public.”80 This gives the AG the power to act in
almost any situation using the “public interest” as means of suit.81 “‘To pre68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 708–09, 187 S.W.2d at 329 (quoting 5 AM. JUR. § 244).
Id. at 709, 187 S.W.2d at 329.
184 So.3d 908 (Miss. 2014).
Id. at 909.
Id. at 910.
678 So.2d 994 (Miss. 1996).
Williams, 184 So.3d at 912–13.
Id. at 917.
See id. at 912.
806 S.W.2d 535 (Tenn. 1990).
Id. at 537 (citing 7 AM. JUR. 2D Att’y Gen. § 9 (1980)).
Id.
Id. (citing 7 AM. JUR. 2D Att’y Gen. § 15 (1980)).
NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN, supra note 11, at 40.

2021]

THE POWERS OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL

117

vent the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare is often
of itself sufficient to give [the AG] standing in court.’”82 In other words, the
AG has the power to bring suit whenever he or she sees necessary to act in
the interest of the state, without a judicial limitation or legislative oversight
in determining what is or is not public interest.83
In another Tennessee case, State v. Chastain,84 the Tennessee Supreme
Court addressed whether the AG could challenge the constitutionality of a
state statute. There is a jurisdictional split about whether a state AG may
challenge its state’s statutes; however, the underlying question is whether
the AG is acting in the interest of the state and public.85 The Court stated
that “the best resolution of this issue [is to] recogniz[e] the duty of the attorney general to advocate the position of the state” but keep his “oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
the State of Tennessee.”86 Thus, in certain situations, the AG’s duty to uphold the state constitution and protect the public’s interest are duties requiring separate treatment.87
Florida law provides that the AG “[s]hall appear in and attend to, in
behalf of the state, all suits or prosecutions, civil or criminal or in equity, in
which the state may be a party, or in anywise interested, in the Supreme
Court and district courts of appeal of this state.”88 This statute gives the AG
the power to intervene and determine when and if the state is interested: the
AG “[s]hall have and perform all powers and duties incident or usual to such
office.”89
State ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp.90 comprehensively discussed the
common law powers of the AG. The court stated that the issue of the AG’s
authority “simply [was] not an extremely close question.”91 The court spoke
of how the AG fits within the common law, statutes, and constitution.
[T]he attorneys general of our states have enjoyed a significant degree
of autonomy. Their duties and powers typically are not exhaustively defined
by either constitution or statute but include all those exercised at common
law. There is and has been no doubt that the legislature may deprive the
attorney general of specific powers; but in the absence of such legislative
action, he typically may exercise all such authority as the public interest
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Heath, 806 S.W.2d at 537 (citing 7 AM. JUR. 2D Att’y Gen. § 15).
See id.
871 S.W.2d 661 (Tenn. 1994).
Id. at 662–63, 665.
Id. at 665.
See id.
FLA. STAT. § 16.01(4) (2020).
Id. § 16.01(7).
526 F.2d 266 (Fla. 1976).
Id. at 274.
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requires. And the attorney general has wide discretion in making the determination as to the public interest.92
The Florida court, in 1976, held that the AG has “wide discretion in
making the determination as to the public interest,” and appears to have predicted that what is of public interest might be at issue in the future.93 However, it failed to elaborate on this point, leaving the issue up to future debate.
In Barati v. State,94 another Florida case, the state via the AG filed a
motion of voluntary dismissal that left the plaintiff with no standing. In this
case a private citizen filed a qui tam lawsuit on behalf of the State against
Motorola, Inc., under the Florida False Claims Act.95 After service of the
complaint, the State via the AG conducted an investigation and decided not
to join the action.96 The private citizen continued to litigate and prosecute
the claim for three years until the AG filed a motion of voluntary dismissal,
therefore ending the citizen’s only opportunity to recover.97 The petitioner
moved to strike the dismissal, but the Court affirmed that the AG did have
the power to dismiss the action.98 By statute, the AG is given absolute authority to terminate qui tam litigation and is only limited by the requirement
to show a good cause to intervene in the action.99
In State ex rel. Allain v. Mississippi Public Service Commission,100
Mississippi Power and Light Company attempted to change utility rates with
the Mississippi Public Service Commission. The AG intervened on behalf of
the State as a “substantial rate payer ($7,011,824.00 in 1980), and all taxpayers of the State.”101 The Court stated,
Paramount to all of his duties, of course, is his duty to protect the interest
of the general public. . . . The attorney general has a large staff which
can be assigned in such a manner as to afford independent legal counsel
and representation to the various agencies. The unique position of the attorney general requires that when his views differ from or he finds himself at odds with an agency, then he must allow the assigned counsel or
specially appointed counsel to represent the agency unfettered and unin92. Id. at 268–69.
93. See id. at 269.
94. 198 So.3d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
95. Id. at 72 (explaining that when a private citizen brings an action and sues on behalf
of himself and the State, that “action is called a qui tam action, from the Latin phrase: “qui
tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur.” Black’s Law Dictionary translates the phrase as: ‘who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.’” (quoting
State v. Barati, 150 So. 3d 810, 811–12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 78 (citing FLA. STAT. § 68.084 (2009)).
100. 418 So.2d 779 (Miss. 1982).
101. Id. at 780.
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fluenced by the attorney general’s personal opinion. If the public interest
is involved, he may intervene to protect it.102

The holding provides that the AG may intervene in a case on behalf of
the public and assign staff lawyers to represent a state agency even in a
highly controversial case. Because the AG disagreed with the agency position, he was required to assign the case to counsel independent of his supervision. However, it is not easy to ascertain an individual’s personal opinion.
These cases show that the AG has the common law authority to utilize “public interest” to determine what and how to represent, defend, and enforce the
legal interests of state government and the public.103 State AGs have the
power to control and manage all litigation on behalf of the state,104 but they
frequently use this power in a manner that accords with their political ambitions over the public interest.
B.

Duty to Defend

An AG’s duty to defend has become a controversial topic of discussion
as of late.105 In both political parties, AGs have refused “to defend state laws
on the grounds that those laws transgress the federal and state constitutions.”106 “The acute split among [AGs] is predictable; the absence of clear
law and the abundance of politics account for the divide.”107 As Devins and
Praskash point out, AGs can cite to their oath of office in justifying their
failure to defend.108
In Arkansas, the state constitution is silent upon the duty to defend, but
by statute, “[t]he Attorney General shall maintain and defend the interests of
the state in matters before the United States Supreme Court and all other
federal courts and shall be the legal representative of all state officers,
boards, and commissions in all litigation where the interests of the state are
involved.”109
102. Id. at 782, 784.
103. See supra Part II.A.
104. See 7A C.J.S. Att’y Gen. § 28.
105. See Matt Apuzzo, Holder Sees Way to Curb Bans on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/us/holder-says-state-attorneys-generaldont-have-to-defend-gay-marriage-bans.html (noting that attorneys general in California,
Illinois, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have all refused to defend bans on
same-sex marriage); Niraj Chokshi, Seven Attorneys General Won’t Defend Their Own
State’s Gay-Marriage Bans, WASH. POST: GOVBEAT (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/02/20/six-attorneys-general-wont-defend-theirown-states-gay-marriage-bans (same).
106. Devins & Prakash, supra note 3, at 2102.
107. Id. at 2103.
108. Id.
109. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-16-703(a) (2019).

120

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Mississippi statutorily mandates that the AG defend the constitutionality of state law, prescribing that the AG assume all powers at common law.110
The Mississippi Constitution is silent on whether the AG has a duty to defend.111 The AG is charged to intervene in any action where the constitutionality of a statute is called into question and to “argue the constitutionality of
any [such] statute.”112 Consequently, a duty to defend is mandated by this
statute. Yet whether the AG actually performs this duty to his or her best
ability is questionable. There has been no known issue with the Mississippi
AG failing or refusing to defend a law, although the issue drew public attention in 2019.113 In 2012, the Mississippi legislature amended the state statute
to provide state agencies and officers the power to employ independent
counsel when the AG refuses to represent the agency or officer or when the
agency has a “significant disagreement with the Attorney General as to the
legal strategy to be used in the matter.”114 This statute refers back to the
holding in State ex rel. Allain v. Mississippi Public Service Commission.115
The Tennessee Constitution is silent on the AG’s duty to defend state
laws, but Tennessee provides statutory guidance for when the AG may and
may not refuse to defendstate law.116 The Tennessee Code grants the AG an
“out” from the duty to defend as long as “a sufficient adversary relationship
exists before the discretion not to defend . . . be exercised.”117 There are
three reported instances where the Tennessee AG has refused to defend state
law, once in 1993 and twice more in 1999, in cases that involved abortion
and tax notices.118
Recently, the Tennessee legislature considered a bill to expand the
AG’s duties to include representation of employees in a court or administrative tribunal arising out of the adoption of a policy requiring individuals to
utilize the facilities that correspond to that individual’s biological sex.119
This issue could cause another scenario in which an AG refuses to defend
110.
111.
112.
113.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-1; NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., supra note 11, at 32.
Devins & Prakash, supra note 3, at 2166.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-1.
See Larrison Campbell, Hood Will Continue Defending 6-Week Abortion Ban, MISS.
TODAY (June 20, 2019), https://mississippitoday.org/2019/06/20/hood-will-continuedefending-6-week-abortion-ban/ (discussing AG Jim Hood of Mississippi and his decision to
defend abortion ban after speculation that he might refuse to fulfill his statutory duty to defend state law in Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 379 F. Supp. 3d 549 (S.D. Miss.
2019)).
114. H.B. 211, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess., sec. 6 (Miss. 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-39.
115. Mississippi Public Service Commission, 418 So.2d at 782.
116. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-109(b)(9)–(10) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-1; ARK.
CODE ANN. § 25-16-702 (2019).
117. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-109(b)(9)–(10) (emphasis added).
118. Devins & Prakash, supra note 3, at 2180–81.
119. S.B. 1499, 111th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2019). (This bill died in chamber.)
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state law. The “bathroom bill” would have provided an option to fund a private attorney that would be in the best interest of the local education agency
or local education agency’s employee.120 If passed, the AG would have been
required to advise local education agencies in regard to implementing policies “on the use of multi-person locker rooms, restrooms, or other similar
facilities for use based on one’s biological sex.”121 This situation almost certainly would have resulted in the AG opting to take the position that a sufficient adversary relationship exists; however, the bill failed.
The Florida Constitution is silent as to whether the AG has a duty to
defend.122 However, Florida statute provides that the AG “[s]hall appear in
and attend to, . . . all suits or prosecutions, civil or criminal or in equity, in
which the state may be party, or in anywise interested, in the Supreme Court
and district courts of appeal of this state,”123 thus mandating that the AG
defend whenever the State is a party of interest. In 2000, the AG refused to
defend when the State moved to dismiss an appeal of a partial-birth abortion
statute.124 The duty to defend has become a prominent issue in the United
States.125 The duty-to-defend analysis has become a review of the public’s
interest by courts on a case-by-case basis.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In State Attorneys General Powers and Responsibilities, the NAAG
says that the powers and responsibilities of state AGs have expanded and
“enhanced the role of the attorney general as a ‘public interest lawyer’ and
offer many opportunities to improve the quality of life for citizens of the
states and jurisdictions.”126 AGs are generally housed within the executive
branch of state government.127 Situations that result in disagreement between
the AG and state officials form one area of concern with partisan views being more prominent in today’s time.128
As the NAAG said, “[o]rdinarily, attorney general representation of a
state agency fulfills the public interest.”129 However, the public interest can
sometimes be unclear. Of course, there is bipartisan support in protecting
citizens in issues like asbestos litigation, the ill effects of tobacco, cyber120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Devins & Prakash, supra note 3, at 2160.
123. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.01(4) (2019).
124. Devins & Prakash, supra note 3, at 2181 (citing A Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 1998)).
125. Devins & Prakash, supra note 3, at 2153.
126. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., supra note 11, at 47.
127. Id. at 49.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 53.
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crime, organized crime prosecution, and pharmaceutical drug manufacturers
exploiting citizens.130 The Arkansas case Karston provides the best example
of what the public’s interest should be: “‘to restrain acts which are injurious
to public health, safety, or morals, and [to] prevent any invasion upon the
rights of the public in highways, parks, and other public lands, and in navigable waters.’”131
In 2019, the Mississippi Governor and both legislative houses had a
Republican majority, but the AG was a Democrat tasked with upholding the
AG’s duty to defend lawfully enacted state statutes. An abortion statute was
passed by the Mississippi Legislature that pushed the envelope of constitutionality.132 Many believed that AG Hood would refuse to defend the statute,
though he ultimately did defend it.133 But the matter could have easily gone
in another direction; all AG Hood would have had to use as an excuse for
declining the defense of the new statute was that he was acting in the “public’s interest” in declining to defend the anti-abortion statute. He might also
have appointed independent counsel to handle the case.
As the top law officers of the states, AGs should have an obligation to
defend the constitutionality of state statutes to their utmost ability, even if
they disagree with the policy fostered by the statute. Since most AGs are
popularly elected, they hold the trust of the citizens and should have a duty
to defend statutes that the citizens’ representatives have established. The
question of what is the “public’s interest” is not a legal test like the “shocks
the conscience” test. Determining the public’s interest is a political test that
is measured by elections and legislation.
As stated in Tennessee’s State v. Heath,134 “‘[t]o prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare is often of itself sufficient to give it standing in court,’” but further guidance on what is or is not
of the public interest is absent in this opinion. Arkansas’s Karston is a bit
more specific in stating that the public’s interest concerns “public health,
safety, or morals.”135 Issues pertaining to tobacco and drugs clearly fall under these parameters, but partisan issues leave room for speculation and an
opportunity not to defend. States should consider statutory guidelines to
provide the proper analysis for AGs to perform when determining what is
130. See id. at 46–47.
131. State ex rel. Williams v. Karston, 208 Ark. 703, 708–09, 187 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ark.
1945) (quoting 5 AM. JUR. § 244).
132. Larrison Campbell, Hood Will Continue Defending 6-Week Abortion Ban, MISS.
TODAY (June 20, 2019), https://mississippitoday.org/2019/06/20/hood-will-continuedefending-6-week-abortion-ban/ (discussing AG Jim Hood of Mississippi’s decision to defend abortion ban after speculation that he might refuse to fulfill his statutory duty to defend
state law).
133. Id.
134. 806 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Tenn. 1990) (quoting 7 AM. JUR. 2D Att’y Gen. § 15 (1980)).
135. Karston, 208 Ark. 703 at 708–09, 187 S.W.2d at 329.
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the public’s interest and how best to ensure that the AG acts on behalf of the
public’s true interest. Or states could mandate the duty to defend lawfully
enacted state laws because without the AG’s defense, there might be little
opportunity to advocate fully for state law under judicial assault.
In 2017, Alan Greenblatt, Senior Staff Writer for Governing, wrote,
“The American system of governance is all about splitting power. When it
comes to legal matters, the attorney general is most often going to be the one
who has the final word.”136 Defending state laws is a cornerstone of the
AG’s duties, and the courts are where constitutionality of state laws should
be determined.137 Former AG of Indiana Greg Zoeller says, “To bring that
question to the courts, there has to be a lawyer on both sides.”138 Therefore,
when AGs refuse to defend or opt out, they undermine the ability of the judicial process properly to vet the constitutionality of statutes.
AGs are the chief law officers in all states, and in most states have the
exclusive authority to represent the state and its officers.139 However, what is
“usual” to the AG’s office is not so clear. The common law can be confusing and sometimes counterintuitive to providing the best outcome for citizens. States like Mississippi should amend their constitutions or enact new
statutes to provide a clear and precise prescription of the AG’s powers and
responsibilities when it comes to representing the public’s interest. In Tennessee, providing the AG with an out to decline the defense of a state law
when “a sufficient adversary relationship exists” curtails the opportunity to
determine constitutionality of state law and determine the public’s interest.140
A targeted universal approach to reforming state constitutions and statutes would provide an agreeable framework that requires AGs to defend
state law and uphold the public’s interest without continuously politicizing
the office. AGs have the constitutional experts residing in their offices, so
they should work more closely with legislatures in developing state laws,141
possibly by designating an Assistant AG to their respective state legislatures
to aid in drafting in an effort to reduce the number of constitutional challenges and improve the legislation the Legislature produces.

136. Alan Greenblatt, What Happens When the Attorney General Refuses to Defend a
Law?, GOVERNING (Aug. 2017), https://www.governing.com/gov-attorney-general-refusaldefend-state-laws.html?flipboard=yes (noting that in lawsuits involving high-profile partisan
issues, some state attorneys general choose to sit out.).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., supra note 11, at 51.
140. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-109 (emphasis added on what is necessary for the AG to
not defend a state law or statute).
141. See Greenblatt, supra note 136.
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CONCLUSION

Part I asked the question, “What is the public’s interest?” Each state’s
AG has similar duties and “job descriptions,” but they all have different
levels of restrictions on their powers and responsibilities.142 As discussed in
Part III, each state builds on the common law derived from English common
law, though now fragmented, since each state establishes its own common
law. The common law provides state AGs with the authority to “represent,
defend, and enforce the legal interests of state government and the public”143
but does not create the same powers and responsibilities from state to
state.144
The main focus of this note looked to what is and is not in the public’s
interest for the AG to utilize his or her powers.145 In situations that lead to
disagreement between state AGs and the other executive officers, state
agencies, or the federal government, the AG has the upper hand in determining how the state’s legal strategy will play out. A targeted universal approach should be considered to develop a statutory framework that would
require state AGs to uphold their obligation to serve at the public’s interest
and defend the constitutionality of state laws to their utmost ability, even if
they disagree politically. A balance of the executive at the state level is necessary to defend the office of the state attorney general from becoming a
strictly political position.
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